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WCE 2011f1;2g (see Anam et. al [1]). The pro¯t of ¯rm Fi is given
by
¼i(q1;q2) = (a ¡ bq1 ¡ bq2 + ¢)q1 ¡
1
2
q2
i :
Public ¯rm F1 maximizes social welfare W which is de-
¯ned as the sum of producer surplus and consumer sur-
plus:
W =
Z Q
0
p(x)dx ¡ pQ + ¼1(q1;q2) + ¼2(q1;q2)
=
Z Q
0
p(x)dx ¡ C1(q1) ¡ C2(q2)
=
b
2
Q2 + (a ¡ bQ + ¢)Q ¡
1
2
q2
1 ¡
1
2
q2
2: (1)
We will analyse the four possible cases separately.
2.1 Case 1: (L;L)
In this case, both ¯rms move late; so, ¯rms decide their
outputs after ¢ is revealed to both ¯rms at the end of
stage 1. Maximizing ¯rms' objective functions, we get
the following equilibrium output levels:
q1(¢) =
(b + 1)(a + ¢)
b2 + 3b + 1
;
q2(¢) =
a + ¢
b2 + 3b + 1
:
Therefore, social welfare is given by
AL;L = W =
¡
b3 + 5b2 + 8b + 2
¢
¾2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 +
+
¡
b3 + 5b2 + 8b + 2
¢
a2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 ; (2)
and ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
BL;L = ¼2 =
(2b + 1)¾2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 +
(2b + 1)a2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2: (3)
We note that, in the presence of uncertainty (¾2 > 0),
taking the output decision after the resolution of the ran-
dom variable enhances ¯rms' payo®s since ¯rms are now
able to make more well-informed decisions. The bene¯t
of making a well-informed decision is captured by the ¯rst
term in equations (2) and (3). This is called the option
value e®ect. This option value increases with the degree
of uncertainty. Clearly, the option value e®ect ceases to
prevail under certainty. In this case, waiting does not
carry any information value.
2.2 Case 2: (E;E)
In this case, both ¯rms move early; so, ¯rms decide their
outputs before ¢ becomes known. Maximizing ¯rms' ob-
jective functions, we get the following equilibrium output
levels:
q1 =
(b + 1)a
b2 + 3b + 1
;
q2 =
a
b2 + 3b + 1
:
Therefore, the (ex-ante) expected social welfare is given
by
AE;E = E(W) =
¡
b3 + 5b2 + 8b + 2
¢
a2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 ; (4)
and the (ex-ante) expected ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
BE;E = E(¼2) =
(2b + 1)a2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2: (5)
We observe that if ¾2 = 0, then AL;L = AE;E and BL;L =
BE;E.
Furthermore, the ex-post social welfare is given by
W =
(b + 1)
¡
b2 + 4b + 1
¢
¢2 + 2
¡
b3 + 5b2 + 7b + 2
¢
a¢
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 +
+
¡
b3 + 5b2 + 8b + 2
¢
a2
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 ; (6)
and the ex-post ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
¼2 =
(b + 1)
¡
(3b + 1)¢2 + 2(2b + 1)a¢ + (b + 1)a2¢
2(b2 + 3b + 1)
2 :
(7)
2.3 Case 3: (E;L)
In this case, ¯rm F1 moves early and ¯rm F2 moves late;
so, the public ¯rm acts as a Stackelberg leader, while the
private ¯rm is a follower. We determine the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. Suppose
that the public ¯rm F1 has chosen the output q1 in the
¯rst stage.
Maximizing ¯rm F2's pro¯t function, we get
q2(q1;¢) =
a ¡ bq1 + ¢
2b + 1
:
Now, maximizing expected social welfare
E(W(q1;q2(q1;¢)));
knowing the above quantity q2(q1;¢), we get
q1 =
¡
b2 + 3b + 1
¢
a
b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1
:
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 2011 Vol I 
WCE 2011, July 6 - 8, 2011, London, U.K.
ISBN: 978-988-18210-6-5 
ISSN: 2078-0958 (Print); ISSN: 2078-0966 (Online)
WCE 2011By substitution, we obtain
q2 =
(2b + 1)a
b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1
+
¢
2b + 1
:
Therefore, the (ex-ante) expected social welfare is given
by
AE;L = E(W) =
(3b + 1)¾2
2(2b + 1)
2 +
¡
b2 + 6b + 2
¢
a2
2(b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1)
;
(8)
and the (ex-ante) expected ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
BE;L = E(¼2) =
¾2
2(2b + 1)
+
(2b + 1)3a2
2(b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1)
2: (9)
Furthermore, the ex-post social welfare is given by
W =
(3b + 1)¢2
2(2b + 1)
2 +
¡
2b3 + 13b2 + 10b + 2
¢
a¢
(2b + 1)(b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1)
+
+
¡
b2 + 6b + 2
¢
a2
2(b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1)
2; (10)
and the ex-post ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
¼2 =
¢2
2(2b + 1)
+ (2b + 1)a¢ +
(2b + 1)3a2
2(b3 + 7b2 + 5b + 1)
2:
(11)
2.4 Case 4: (L;E)
In this case, ¯rm F1 moves late and ¯rm F2 moves early;
so, the public ¯rm acts as a follower, while the private
¯rm is a Stackelberg leader. We determine the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. Sup-
pose that the private ¯rm F2 has chosen the output q2 in
the ¯rst stage.
Maximizing social welfare, we get
q1(q2;¢) =
a ¡ bq2 + ¢
b + 1
:
Now, maximizing expected ¯rm F2's pro¯t
E(¼2(q1(q2;¢);q2);
knowing the above quantity q1(q2;¢), we get
q2 =
a
3b + 1
:
By substitution, we obtain
q1 =
(2b + 1)a
(b + 1)(3b + 1)
+
¢
b + 1
:
Therefore, the (ex-ante) expected social welfare is given
by
AL;E = E(W) =
¾2
2(b + 1)
+
¡
9b2 + 10b + 2
¢
a2
2(b + 1)(3b + 1)2 ; (12)
and the (ex-ante) expected ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
BL;E = E(¼2) =
a2
2(b + 1)(3b + 1)
: (13)
Furthermore, the ex-post social welfare is given by
W =
¢2
2(b + 1)
+
(3b + 2)a¢
(b + 1)(3b + 1)
+
+
¡
9b2 + 10b + 2
¢
a2
2(b + 1)(3b + 1)2 ; (14)
and the ex-post ¯rm F2's pro¯t is given by
¼2 =
a2 + 2a¢
2(b + 1)(3b + 1)
: (15)
3 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied a model in which timing and
output games are played between a public and a private
¯rm in a market with demand uncertainty. We computed
the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We
also determined ex-ante and ex-post ¯rms' payo® func-
tions.
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